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Abstract: 
The current debate over female labor force participation in India has failed to sufficiently account 
for the reproductive work of women. Using NSS data on reproductive labor, we investigate the 
possibility that a “reproductive squeeze” raises the opportunity costs of labor force participation 
for women. A variety of multinomial logit regressions reveal a robust positive relationship 
between the shares of non-discretionary food and non-food expenditure and  the likelihood of 
performing reproductive labor, relative to being in the labor force. We also find that an indicator 
of greater social provisioning by the state is positively correlated with rural women’s labor force 
participation, all else constant. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Declining rural female labor force participation rates (FLFPRs) account for a significant share of the 
drop in overall labor force participation rates in post-liberalization India (Rangarajan et al 2011). Some 
authors have drawn upon Goldin’s concept of a U-shaped relationship between female labor force 
participation and per capita income to explain this decline (Goldin 1995).  They argue that Indian women 
are withdrawing from the labor market as a result of an “income effect” associated with increased 
household well-being (Abraham 2013, Das et al 2015, Sorsa et al 2015). Recent work has questioned the 
empirical and theoretical applicability of this hypothesis to India (Lahoti and Swaminathan 2016), and 
suggested that any income effect may be relatively small (Kapsos et al. 2014), restricted to more 
developed states (Mehrotra and Parida 2017) and weaker in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s (Afridi et 
al 2016). 
On the other hand, there is evidence that the decline in agricultural employment since the 1990s has 
disproportionately hurt women in rural India (Mazumdar and Agnihotri 2011, Kannan and Raveendran 
2012). An alternative explanation is thus that rural women have experienced a ‘discouraged worker 
effect’ with a decrease in demand for women workers forcing them out of the labor market (Das 2006, 
Afridi et al 2016).  
These different explanations for declining FLFPRs do have one common characteristic: neither pays 
sufficient attention to the rise in women’s labor of social reproduction that corresponds to this fall in 
FLFPR1. Some income effect proponents assume that rural Indian women who are not in the labor force 
are engaged in ‘status producing’ activities (e.g., Abraham 2011). This reflects social scientists’ 
longstanding tendency to treat reproductive labor as non-work, despite a large feminist literature that 
establishes the importance of reproductive labor in producing and maintaining labor power and ensuring 
the survival of the household (Beneria and Sen 1981, Elson 2010). As feminists have shown, the labor of 
social reproduction is both physically and emotionally arduous, comprising the work of biological 
reproduction (including the production of children), the associated production of goods and services 
necessary for the maintenance of human life (such as the collection of water and fuel, cooking, etc.), as 
well as care work (Razavi 2007).  
Of particular relevance to the Indian debate is the argument made by feminists that in times of crises, 
women’s unpaid labor increases to ensure household survival, with increased time and effort spent on 
foraging for food and fuel, caring for dependents, and producing basic goods and services at home (Floro 
1995, Elson 2010). This in turn then makes it harder for women to find paid work that will allow them to 
fulfill these increased reproductive responsibilities. In the 2000s, the period we are studying in this paper, 
1 Afridi et al (2016) do propose increased household productivity as one explanation for reduced FLFPR, but do not 
examine this effect more closely. 
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the Indian state engaged in minimal social provisioning (Palriwala and Neetha 2009). Households thus 
had to cope with growing expenditure on education and health amidst inadequate public investment in the 
infrastructure of basic services such as water, fuel or education, and declining access to the commons 
(Laxminarayana et al 2012, Hirway and Jose 2011, Basu and Basole 2015).  Further, the effects of 
demographic changes that have unfolded over the last three decades are complex, with some aspects of 
such changes reducing women’s reproductive labor, while others increase it (Razavi 2007).  
We hypothesize that an increase in the burden of household reproduction plays a part in reducing 
female labor force participation in India, an argument we call the “reproductive squeeze”. This argument 
overlaps with the discouraged worker effect in two ways. First, increased reproductive burdens narrow the 
range of jobs women can take while still bearing those burdens, increasing the likelihood of a failed job 
search; and second, for poor rural Indians, the absence of paid work means additional reproductive labor 
becomes necessary to produce the goods and services necessary for survival.  
The quinquennial Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) data used in most research on Indian 
FLFPR includes data on reproductive work performed by women who are not in the labor force. After 
an early analysis by Sen and Sen (1985), this data been relatively neglected until recently. Recent 
studies have either called for, or analyzed, individual rounds of this data (Mukherjee 2011, Hirway 
2012, Naidu 2016, Naidu and Ossome 2016, Siddiqui et al 2017), but we have not come across an 
analysis of this data across time. In this paper we contribute to the literature by empirically 
investigating whether a ‘reproductive squeeze’ may play a role in reducing women’s labor force 
participation, even after controlling for any income effect.  
As part of our broader attempt to treat reproductive work as an analytical category with its own 
dynamics, we also try to open up the ‘black box’ of reproductive labor to the extent that we can 
within the NSS data. The NSS divides reproductive labor into two categories, and in this paper we 
investigate the differences between these two categories over time. We find that this more fine 
grained analysis of the data casts further doubt upon the notion that women are retreating into purely 
“status producing” activities, with the largest increases being in relatively physically arduous 
activities related to food security. 
We use data from the NSS employment and unemployment household surveys for 1999-2000, 
2009-10 and 2011-12, thus covering India’s ‘boom years’. We exclude the 2004-05 NSS due to the 
fact that it was a ‘distress’ year that may have resulted in unusually high rural labor force 
participation rates (Abraham 2011). We include both the 2009-10 and 2011-12 data because these two 
rounds were conducted unusually close to each other – a gap of two years, rather than the usual five – 
with some researchers suspecting a political motivation for this timing. We do not take a side in this 
debate, but instead include both in our analysis and treat them as contemporaneous so as to avoid 
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excessively relying upon either one. Finally, we restrict our analysis to women of working age (15-64 
years) who constitute 80 percent of the reduction in overall female labor force participation rates 
(Rangarajan et al 2011). The study of child labor is thus outside the scope of this paper. 
2.0 Economic growth and rural India in the 2000s 
India experienced an economic boom in the 2000s with real GDP growth averaging about 7.5% 
from the period 2000-02 to 2011-12.  However, there are four characteristics of this boom that complicate 
its impact upon rural households, and thus upon the work that rural women do.  
First, this growth has been sectorally uneven and its impact on employment has been gendered. 
Agricultural output grew at about half the rate of output in industry and services during this period. 
Agricultural wage and self-employment declined by 30.3 million between 2004-05 and 2011-12, with 
81.2% of this decline accounted for by women (Thomas 2012). Rural non-agricultural employment 
growth was almost entirely accounted for by an increase in casual wage work in construction, work which 
is precarious and spatially fragmented. Furthermore, for women this growth was not sufficient to 
compensate for falling agricultural employment. Women accounted for only 17.9 % of the 25.9 million 
jobs created in the rural non-agricultural sector from 2004-05 to 2011-12 (Thomas 2012). 
Second, most of the jobs created have been in the informal sector. The accompanying precarity 
has forced rural households to engage in multiple and shifting forms of livelihood generation (Naidu and 
Ossome 2016), including temporary, circular migration, which may affect the labor available for domestic 
tasks. Third, this growth, which has been driven in part by industries such as mining and real estate, has 
accelerated the privatization of the commons (Maringanti et al 2012). Along with a demographic shift that 
has caused a decline in average rural household size, this has implications for the effects of economic 
change upon reproductive labor. 
 Last but not least, this growth has not been accompanied by any significant shift in the gender 
division of household labor, particularly in rural India. Any analysis of the impact of this particular form 
of economic growth upon women’s work thus has to take into account the fact that women must allocate 
their time between work that economists recognize as ‘productive’, as well as the unpaid labor of care 
work and domestic production. In this paper we refer to women’s engagement in the former as ‘labor 
force participation’, and the latter as ‘reproductive labor’.  
The impact of economic growth on women’s allocation of time is uncertain. Rising wages could 
increase the opportunity cost of reproductive labor, while technological advances make reproductive labor 
more capital intensive, and thus reduce the number of labor hours spent on such labor. Decreases in 
fertility rates could also mean a decrease in the demand for reproductive labor, as could greater public 
investment in basic services such as water and fuel provision, education (which serves as a substitute for 
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childcare), and the social safety net. We note below that in rural India, water collection from 
outside the village has become less widely reported, and some forms of food processing (such as 
the husking of rice) appear to have decreased in frequency. Thus even in the absence of a change 
in the gender division of labor, economic growth could result in fewer hours devoted to 
reproductive labor. 
However, if growth does not enable the purchase of substitutes for household labor, i.e., due to 
lack of sufficient high quality employment and/or because other socially necessary expenditure (such as 
on health or education) grows even faster, unpaid reproductive labor may have to compensate to maintain 
household consumption. We note below both the relatively small increases in household income for the 
bottom three quintiles of rural households, as well as the increase in the share of expenditure on non-
discretionary non-food items (particularly education, health and fuel) during the 2000s (Table 2).  
These effects would be exacerbated by a decrease in access to the commons, as is occurring 
across India (Laxminarayana et al 2012). A majority of rural households still use bio-fuels such as 
firewood for cooking, and do not have access to tap water within their own homes. They thus depend on 
the commons to access the raw materials of social reproduction. An increase in the time required to 
collect the raw materials of social reproduction would reduce women’s time flexibility, preventing them 
from being able to balance reproductive work with labor force participation (Hirway 2012). 
The likelihood of such an effect increases to the extent that the state fails to subsidize 
reproductive activities, as is the case in India (Palriwala and Neetha 2009). Despite some increase in 
social sector expenditure shares by state and central governments in the second half of the 2000s, they 
have not returned to pre-liberalization peaks, and there is considerable evidence that public investment in 
social services remains inadequate (Planning Commission 2011). Indeed, Das et al (2015) show that 
greater social spending by the state increases female labor force participation, although they do not 
elaborate upon the connection to burdens of reproductive labor. 
 We are arguing here that the majority of rural households in India are unable to access substitutes 
for women’s reproductive labor, even as the need for such labor increases. In the context of changing 
demographics and privatization of the commons, we see this need as driven by inadequate social 
provisioning for poorer households in conjunction with rising non-discretionary expenditure, creating a 
reproductive squeeze that forces a greater reliance on ‘free’ household production of goods and services 
(Elson 2010). In this paper, we therefore examine the impact of an increased share of non-discretionary 
household expenditure and the impact of state subsidization of food upon women’s labor. 
 
 
3.0 Economic vulnerability and female labor force participation  
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Following the NSS, we define ‘labor force participation’ (LFP) as employment in regular or 
casual paid work, self-employment (including an unpaid worker in a family business), or unemployment 
(which implies actively seeking employment)2. Table 1 lays out the decline in rural principal status 
women’s labor force participation rates from 51 percent in 1999-2000 to 44 percent and 42 percent in 
2009-10 and 2011-12.  
We use NSS household expenditure data to generate real monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure (MPCE) in 2011-12 rupees, and divide the population into quintiles based on household 
MPCE. Table 2 demonstrates that the decline in employment is concentrated in the bottom three MPCE 
quintiles. In fact, there is actually an increase in FLFP in the top quintile. Table 2 also shows that lower 
quintiles in rural India have seen smaller increases in the average MPCE, with an average of a less than 
2% per annum for the bottom three quintiles. Finally, the table shows that lower quintiles have larger 
expenditure shares on non-discretionary food and non-food expenditure shares combined, but also that, 
compared to the top two quintiles, they have experienced smaller declines in food expenditure shares and 
similar or larger increases in non-food expenditure shares  
 NSS data also indicate that the women who have withdrawn from the labor force are 
disproportionately likely to be female agricultural workers, women married to casual agricultural wage 
workers, and women with no formal education3, i.e., those who have benefited least from India’s boom. 
As Kapsos et al (2014) have previously argued, we expect any income effect to be small for such women.  
 
4.0 Women’s Reproductive Labor in the NSS data 
The NSS collects data on reproductive labor under the category “domestic duties”, which it 
further sub-categorizes as ‘domestic activities’ and ‘domestic and allied activities’. ‘Domestic and allied’ 
activities, which we hereafter refer to as ‘allied’ activities, consists of domestic activities performed 
alongside at least one unpaid own-account production activity such as free collection of goods 
(vegetables, roots, firewood, cattle feed etc.), sewing and tailoring, weaving, processing food for 
household consumption etc. This set of activities is assigned activity status code 93 by the NSS. While the 
NSS does not explicitly define ‘domestic activities’, this category, which is assigned activity status code 
92 by the NSS, presumably includes services for own-use such as the unpaid care of dependents, cooking 
																																								 																				
2 The NSS reports both principal employment (employment for more than 185 days a year) as well as subsidiary 
employment (employment that lasts less than 185 days a year), but the bulk of the FLFPR decline is accounted 
for by changes in principal rather than subsidiary status. Further, there is a large overlap between subsidiary 
employment and principal status reproductive work. From the perspective of our data analysis, this means that 
coding principal and subsidiary status employment together as employment causes us to “lose” from our analysis 
a large share of those who represent themselves as principal status reproductive workers. As a result, we restrict 
ourselves to principal status LFP only. 
3 Tables available upon request 
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and cleaning (Mukherjee 2011). This category thus includes all forms of services produced for 
self-consumption.  
 The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) in fact includes many ‘allied’ 
activities, related to production of water, fuel and food, in SNA calculations even though these 
are not produced for the market (Razavi 2007). The NSS, however, excludes both allied activities 
and domestic activities from calculation of the official labor force. The official and problematic 
reason provided for not even including subsistence production of goods (allied activities) in labor 
force calculation is that such activities are carried out by an insignificant number of people 
(Hirway 2012). This exclusion from official statistics means that often these reproductive 
activities are perceived as unproductive leisure activities, a tendency which feminists have long 
criticized (Power 2004).  Most contemporary studies of female labor force participation neither question this 
limited definition of the official labor force, nor differentiate between the categories of ‘domestic’ 
and ‘domestic and allied’ work (se Naidu 2016; Siddiqui et al 2017 for exceptions). Rather, the 
proponents of the income effect hypothesis treat reproductive labor as ‘status producing’ (e.g. 
Abraham 2011), and thus disregard the considerable body of work on the importance of 
reproductive labor to household survival and reproduction.  
Table 1 indicates that allied work has increased over the 2000s, with the share of those reporting 
domestic work only either increasing by less than allied work (2009-10) or actually declining (2011-12). 
Further, Table 2 indicates that the share of women engaged in allied work has increased the most for the 
lower MPCE quintiles. This data provides ample cause to question the NSS’ own claims about the 
supposed insignificance of these activities (Hirway 2012).  
In the NSS interview module on allied activities, women who do not report being in the labor 
force indicate whether they perform each of thirteen tasks classified as allied activities. While the share of 
those reporting collecting water or preparing cowdung cakes (to use as fuel) has fallen, these remain 
amongst the most common allied activities (Table 3). The maintenance of poultry appears to have fallen, 
which may imply more dependence on market provision of meat and eggs. The percentage of women 
reporting tasks related to preparation of food inputs such as husking paddy, preparing meat, grinding food 
or preparing meat) has fallen quite substantially.  
What is striking, however, is the increase in the share of women reporting a set of tasks 
related to food security, i.e., firewood collection, maintenance of kitchen gardens, and, to a lesser 
extent, an increase in the collection of free fruits and fish. Kitchen gardens and free collection of 
goods relate directly to the provision of food items, while firewood collection indirectly affects 
food security, firewood being the main source of cooking fuel in rural India. The degradation of 
or dispossession from private land and the commons may thus have a significant impact on allied 
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activities and hence food security (Naidu 2013). Hirway’s analysis of the only Indian time use survey 
conducted in 1998 (see Hirway and Jose 2011), and past literature on rural dependence on the 
environmental commons in India (e.g. Beck and Ghosh 1994; Jodha 1986) suggest that the poorest 
households are most dependent on such activities for their survival.  
If we narrow allied activities to labor and time consuming, but essential, activities of collection of 
water, firewood, fuel (including the making of cowdung cakes) and food items (including kitchen garden 
and poultry maintenance), we find that by 2011-12, 40% of women not in the labor force across all 
quintiles (and 45% of women in the bottom three quintiles) were engaged in one or more of these 
activities. The only activities on this list that involve being home-bound and do not involve substantial 
physical labor are sewing and tutoring, but shares for both have remained relatively stagnant over this 
period. Overall, the classification of allied activities as “status-producing” thus appears unwarranted.  
Furthermore, around 60% of principal status domestic and allied female workers in 2009-10 and 
2011-12 reported that they spent their time on domestic work because there was no-one else to help. The 
percentage who attributed this to social/religious constraints fell from 21% in 1999-2000 to 16% in 2011-
12. This corresponds to our argument that reductions in the average size of the household may have also 
reduced women’s ability to be flexible in the allocation of their time.  
 
5.0 Regression Analysis: Correlates of Reproductive Labor and Labor Force Participation  
We begin by establishing the socio-economic correlates of the three work status categories: 
women engaged in allied activities, domestic work only, and those in the labor force. We then estimate 
the impact of a reproductive squeeze upon women’s allocation of time, while controlling for a possible 
income effect. In both cases, we interpret our empirical results not as proof of causality, but as partial 
correlates. We report results for all MPCE quintiles as well as the bottom three MPCE quintiles because 
the greatest decline in FLPR occurs in the latter group.  
Our dependent (ordinal) variable is the principal work status of the woman, which can take three 
values: domestic work only, allied work, or labor force participation. The regressors include standard 
demographic variables such as age, age squared (since there may be a non-linear relationship between age 
and the division of labor in an Indian household), whether the woman is currently married, religious 
categories (Hindu versus all other religions), as well as caste categories (Dalit, Adivasi, and Other 
Backward Communities). These also stand in for cultural or social norms that shape the gender division 
of labor.  
We include land possessed by the household in acres, which we expect to have a positive 
association with FLFP due to the demand side effect of women’s labor in agriculture. Women’s education 
levels proxy for possible wage earning capacity if employment is secured. Yet, without adequate supply 
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of jobs, higher educational attainment may yield a discouraged worker effect. We include three 
education-related dummy variables that represent women with primary, secondary and post-
secondary education. Women without any formal education comprise the base/comparison 
category.  
We include the log of real monthly household consumption per capita (log MPCE) as 
well as its squared term. In line with the literature, we employ consumption as an imperfect proxy 
for income (Abraham 2013, Das et al 2015). According to the income effect hypothesis, the level 
term would have a negative coefficient associated with a withdrawal of women from the labor 
force in response to higher incomes, whereas the squared term would have a positive coefficient 
suggesting an increase in FLFPR corresponding to an increase in income beyond a particular 
threshold. We also include time dummies in the regressions.  
We include three variables to capture the effect of a potential ‘reproductive squeeze’. 
Two of these variables relate to the share of basic food and basic non-food items. The share of 
basic food items includes expenditure on non-processed food items such as cereals, milk, eggs, 
vegetables, pulses and meat and excludes consumption of all processed food. The share of basic 
non-food expenditure captures expenditure on education, health, fuel/energy and conveyance. 
Combined, these represent non-discretionary expenditure as a share of total household 
expenditure. High non-discretionary expenditure indicates the extent of economic pressure on 
households. If unpaid reproductive labor serves as an economic shock absorber, as feminist 
economists have argued, then allied work and domestic work would be positively associated with 
shares of non-discretionary expenditure.  
We also include a variable to capture state provisioning that might reduce a potential 
‘reproductive squeeze’. For this, we employ that state level average share of PDS (public 
distribution system) cereal consumption. Despite the state’s reduced commitment to the program 
in the post-liberalization era, PDS is the only social provisioning program in India with continued 
widespread access. We expect it to be negatively associated with allied and domestic work, and 
positively associated with women’s LFP.  
To control for demographic determinants of demand for reproductive labor, we include 
other household demographic characteristics such as household size, the number of children 
under five years, and the number of economically active men in the household. Lower household 
size could reduce the demand for reproductive labor. However, it could also mean fewer adults to 
share reproductive burdens. Ceteris parabis, more adult men in the household could have the 
same effect.  
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5.1 The Regression Model 
Since the three activity status variables are dichotomous, mutually exclusive and have no natural 
ordering, we adopt a multinomial logit model (see Greene 2012). We employ clustered standard errors to 
account for potential correlation in errors within the NSS first stage sampling unit, which is the village. 
This helps correct for what might otherwise be artificially small standard errors. We thus estimate a 
model where y is a vector of three unordered outcomes, i.e., y = 1, 2 and 3, and X is a matrix of regressors 
such that  Pr 𝑦 = 1 = 11 + 𝑒()(+) + 𝑒() - 	
 Pr 𝑦 = 2 = 𝑒()(+)1 + 𝑒()(+) + 𝑒() - 	Pr 𝑦 = 3 = 𝑒()(-)1 + 𝑒()(+) + 𝑒() - 	
 
The coefficients of the regression models represent relative probabilities such that  Pr	(𝑦 = 2)Pr	(𝑦 = 1) = 𝑒()(+)	
In other words, the coefficients are estimated correlations between the regressors upon the 
likelihood of a working age woman reporting LFP versus allied work, LFP versus domestic work, or 
domestic work versus allied work. The population under consideration is working age women and 
excludes those categorized as principal status students, retired or unable to work due to sickness, or those 
who report being ‘beggars or prostitutes’ (NSS activity categories).  
Table 4 presents the baseline results for our statistical analysis in which we regress activity status 
(labor market, allied, and domestic) on the variables described above, in addition to state and time 
dummies to control for state-level and time (2009-10 and 2011-12) fixed effects respectively. In Table 5, 
we add the three provisioning variables (share of non-discretionary spending on basic food and basic non-
food items, and share of PDS consumption) to the regression model. The inclusion of the additional 
variables changes the magnitude but not the sign of the coefficients thus indicating the robustness of our 
results. Since we have data on share of PDS only for 2009-10 and 2011-12, the regression presented in 
Table 5 is limited to these two time periods. We report results for all MPCE quintiles and the bottom 
three MPCE quintiles. The results are robust across different formulations4. 
																																								 																				
4 The regression results in Table 5 are largely unchanged when it is run with the expenditure shares, but not the PDS 
share. As an additional check (results available upon request) we added the state level HDI computed for 1999-00 
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5.2 Results  
5.2.1. Differentiating between women’s activity status categories 
While domestic work, and domestic with allied work have been conflated in most of the 
literature, the coefficients for the 2009-10 and 2011-12 time dummies indicate statistically significant 
increases in allied work, but decreases in domestic work, that are unexplained by our independent 
variables (Table 4). This confirms the trend we noticed in the descriptive statistics section, and suggests 
that there may indeed be some independent dynamics of the allied work category that are worthy of 
further research. Given that we are unable to measure any change in access to the commons in this 
analysis, this may be a link worth exploring further in future research. 
The coefficients for age, education, caste and religion all suggest a greater similarity between 
allied work and participation in the labor force, as compared to domestic work alone (see Table 4). This is 
not surprising given the definitional overlaps between allied work and LFP discussed earlier. An increase 
in household size also decreases the likelihood of allied work as well as LFP versus domestic work, while 
increasing the likelihood of LFP against allied work. An increase in the number of children, household 
size constant, increases the likelihood of allied work relative to domestic work, perhaps because there are 
then fewer other adults with whom to share burdens of allied work. These results indicate the importance 
of demographic factors in determining the allocation of women’s labor time. 
Since there is a greater increase in allied rather than domestic work (see Table 1), and the former 
is labor-intensive and related to subsistence production and food security, these results throw into 
question analyses that treat women’s shift from LFP to reproductive labor as evidence of ‘withdrawing’ 
into high-status leisure-like activities. Instead, the shift may signify economic necessity in the context of 
demographic change and strengthens the argument for greater social provisioning by the state as a means 
of countering these structural tendencies.  
Owning land is positively correlated with LFP, relative to both domestic and allied work, 
confirming the importance of the agricultural sector for women’s employment. We thus note 
evidence for a discouraged worker hypothesis in our results. Given the decrease in average 
landholding over the years, part of the decline in women’s LFP may be coming from declining 
demand for female agriculture labor. But whereas land ownership increases the likelihood of 
allied work versus domestic work for all quintiles, it has no statistical impact on allied versus 
domestic work for the bottom three quintiles. Most allied activities are heavily dependent on 
																																								 																				
and 2007-08. We found that states with higher HDI levels did see a higher likelihood of rural women’s employment, 
particularly as compared to domestic work. We also found that the remaining results were unchanged, indicating 
their robustness. 	
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access to private land or the environmental commons (e.g., Naidu 2013) but perhaps poorer households 
do not own enough land to be able to engage in allied activities on their own private land (as opposed to 
the commons). 
While having primary or secondary education makes women less likely to be in the labor force 
than women without any education, having at least some college education increased the likelihood of 
LFP relative to both allied and domestic work for the whole sample. This may be because more jobs are 
available for highly skilled women workers who can enter the education or government sectors. In the 
bottom three quintiles the effect of college education was weaker, only increasing LFP relative to allied 
work.  
We also control for any income effect by including the (log)MPCE and its squared term. While a 
U-shape relationship exists between consumption expenditure and LFP across all MPCE quintiles, the 
relationship is not statistically significant within the bottom three quintiles (see also Mehrotra and Parida 
2017, who find no income effect for less developed Indian states). 
Coefficients of other variables have the expected signs which remain unchanged for regressions 
of both all MPCE quintiles and the bottom three MPCE quintiles 
  
5.2.2 The impact of the ‘reproductive squeeze’  
Our primary result is that, controlling for income effects, the shares of non-discretionary food and 
non-food expenditure are negatively and statistically significantly correlated with LFP relative to both 
domestic work and allied work for the whole sample as well as the bottom three MPCE quintiles (see 
Table 5). However, both expenditure shares are positively correlated with the likelihood of higher 
domestic work participation relative to allied work. In this too allied work appears to resemble LFP. 
The variable pds_share measures the average share of PDS consumption of cereals by state. It 
suggests that a higher state average share of PDS cereal consumption increases the probability of LFP 
relative to allied and domestic work, without changing the other results. It also increases the probability of 
domestic work relative to allied work. In other words, social provisioning by the state appears to reduce 
the need to engage in the effort intensive work associated with allied activities. This also reinforces the 
finding of Das et al (2015) that greater state social sector spending can increase FLFP in India. However, 
given that the state’s strategy appears to be to continue a reliance on private, market provisioning of these 
goods and services, our results suggest that FLFPR in rural India is unlikely to rise.  
The coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 only report the relative probability of a particular 
activity status vis-à-vis another and therefore do not allow us to fully compare the sizes of the income 
effect and reproductive squeeze effect. Therefore, we calculate the average marginal effect (AME) or the 
average value of the effect of a unit change in the regressor on the probability of observing an outcome, 
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computed across all observed values of the regressor (Table 6).  For the bottom three quintiles, the net 
effect of per capita household consumption expenditure is statistically insignificant. However, a 1 
percentage point increase in the share of non-discretionary food and non-food consumption is associated 
with a reduction in the likelihood of women’s LFP by 0.27 and 0.23 percentage points respectively and an 
increase in domestic work of 0.35 and 0.31 percentage points respectively. Not only does non-
discretionary consumption have a greater negative impact on LFP relative to the income effect, but also 
the privatization of provisioning is more acutely felt in the lowest consumption quintiles.  
The AMEs of expenditure shares upon allied work are statistically insignificant for all quintiles. 
This is likely because higher food and non-food expenditure shares lowered the probability of allied work 
relative to domestic work, while raising it relative to LFP (Table 5) weakening the net effect. The AME of 
the food expenditure share in the bottom three quintiles is statistically significant but negative, a result 
that again resembles the result for LFP.  
The share of PDS, on the other hand, not only affects LFP positively, but its positive impact is 
much higher than the income effect for all consumption quintiles as well as for the bottom three quintiles. 
For a 1 percentage point increase in PDS provisioning, the likelihood of working age women participating 
in the labor market is 1.72 percentage points higher, but women are 0.39 and 0.79 percentage points less 
likely to engage in domestic activities and allied activities respectively in the bottom three consumption 
quintiles. This suggests that higher PDS provisioning could ease the burden of reproduction that is placed 
on women and free up the possibility of higher labor force participation. Particularly in households within 
the bottom three consumption quintiles, the existence of an income effect may be less important than the 
exigencies of reproductive burden in determining women’s decisions about time allocation.  
Taken as a whole, the results associated with the demographic variables as well as the basic 
shares of food and non-food expenditure undermine the argument that reproductive work is merely ‘status 
producing’. They also point to the urgent need to address burdens of reproductive work in these 
households and mitigate the effect of a reproductive squeeze on women’s labor. Greater state support for 
social provisioning that could keep the shares of non-discretionary expenditure in check would be a step 
in the right direction. 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
In the current debate over declining female labor force participation in India, insufficient attention 
has been accorded to understanding women’s reproductive labor. While better data, particularly national 
time use data, would help produce richer analyses of changes in women’s reproductive burdens, in this 
paper we attempt to show that more can be done even with the data that is available from the NSS.  
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 We find evidence that declines in labor force participation for rural Indian women have been 
concentrated amongst women in the worst-off households. These are also the households that have gained 
the least from India’s boom years, so that any income effect is likely too small to explain a reduction in 
FLFPR of the magnitude we have seen in rural India. By taking seriously the differences between NSS 
categories of reproductive labor, we also find that even after controlling for a number of demographic and 
socio-economic variables, there has been an increase in relatively physically burdensome “allied work”, 
particularly when it comes to activities related to food security. We hope that future research will more 
closely investigate whether changing access to the commons is driving this outcome. 
Regression results also suggest some meaningful differences in the way that demographic factors 
and land ownership affect domestic, as opposed to allied work. Given the limitations of the NSS data, this 
paper constitutes a preliminary step in understanding Indian women’s changing work status. More 
research on the specific mechanisms that drive different kinds of reproductive labor would further our 
collective understanding of the constraints facing rural Indian women. 
Our results suggest that higher proportion of non-discretionary spending increases the likelihood 
of allied and domestic work relative to labor force participation, whereas state provisioning increases the 
possibility that women are engaged in labor force participation relative to allied or domestic work. We 
therefore find evidence of a reproductive squeeze that raises the opportunity cost of labor force 
participation but could be mitigated by greater state provisioning. While we control for an income effect, 
we find that such an effect is statistically insignificant for the bottom three quintiles. 
We conclude that a continuation of the pattern of Indian economic growth over the last two 
decades, with growing privatization of social reproduction, and the absence of work that allows women to 
combine their reproductive responsibilities with income generation, is unlikely to increase female labor 
force participation. Our analysis suggests that adequate social provisioning may need to be central to any 
set of policies aimed at increasing female labor force participation rates in rural India.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Work status for rural Indian women, ages 16-64 years 
 Principal and subsidiary status 
combined 
Principal status only 
 1999-
2000 
2009-10 2011-12 1999-
2000 
2009-10 2011-12 
Domestic only 30 33 27 34 36 30 
Allied  19 23 31 26 30 40 
LFPR 51 44 42 40 35 30 
Allied+LFPR 70 67 73 66 65 70 
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Table 2: By quintile, real MPCE, principal work status and basic shares of expenditure 
1999-2000 
(1) 
2009-10 
(2) 
Change 
from (1) 
to (2) 
2011-12 
(3) 
Change 
from (1) 
to (3) 
Quintile 1 
Average Real MPCE 460.80 518.50 12.50 563.60 22.30 
Labor force participation rate 50.33 37.92 -12.41 29.71 -20.62 
Share of allied workers 24.77 30.1 5.33 44.68 19.91 
Basic food share 61.30 58.80 -2.40 56.60 -4.70 
Basic nonfood share 13.50 17.90 4.30 19.50 6.00 
Quintile 2 
Average Real MPCE 630.70 729.30 15.60 795.40 26.10 
Labor force participation rate 43.45 32.71 -10.74 26.67 -16.78 
Share of allied workers 26.33 30.79 4.46 45.71 19.38 
Basic food share 58.80 56.50 -2.30 54.30 -4.50 
Basic nonfood share 14.90 18.90 4.10 20.50 5.70 
Quintile 3 
Average Real MPCE 775.20 915.40 18.10 1004.20 29.50 
Labor force participation rate 40.34 32.79 -7.55 29.93 -10.41 
Share of allied workers 26.79 32.93 6.14 41.17 14.38 
Basic food share 56.70 54.30 -2.40 52.00 -4.70 
Basic nonfood share 16.00 20.10 4.10 21.40 5.40 
Quintile 4 
Average Real MPCE 973.80 1162.40 19.40 1297.10 33.20 
Labor force participation rate 37.34 34.10 -3.24 33.11 -4.23 
Share of allied workers 26.74 29.12 2.38 37.6 10.86 
Basic food share 53.90 51.60 -2.30 49.10 -4.80 
Basic nonfood share 17.90 21.60 3.70 23.50 5.60 
Quintile 5 
Average Real MPCE 1623.40 2028.80 25.00 2326.10 43.30 
Labor force participation rate 31.24 35.36 4.12 31.93 0.69 
Share of allied workers 26.94 25.42 -1.52 31.29 4.35 
Basic food share 46.80 44.30 -2.50 40.90 -5.90 
Basic nonfood share 22.60 27.00 4.40 29.30 6.70 
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Table 3: Kinds of allied work as a share of all female working age rural non-employed workers 
 
 
Kitchen 
garden 
(1) 
Poultry 
(2) 
Free 
collection 
of fish/fruit 
(3) 
Firewood 
(4) 
Water 
(5) 
The making 
of cowdung 
cakes(6) 
Share 
performing at 
least one of (1) 
through (6) 
1999-00 14 33 15 39 51 49 38 
2009-10 25 26 19 43 37 33 39 
2011-12 24 22 19 44 31 36 40 
Change from 
1999 to 2010 11 -7 4 3 -14 -15 1 
Change from 
1999 to 2012 10 -11 4 4 -20 -13 2 
 Tutoring Sewing 
Paddy 
de-husking 
Grinding 
food 
Making 
gur 
Meat and 
fish 
preparation Basket making 
1999-00 6 28 19 20 7 8 10 
2009-10 7 30 14 14 4 6 8 
2011-12 7 29 9 9 3 4 5 
Change from 
1999 to 2010 1 2 -5 -6 -3 -1 -2 
Change from 
1999 to 2012 1 1 -9 -11 -4 -4 -5 
 
 
 
  
20	
Table 4: Baseline Regression Results 
All Quintiles Bottom Three Quintiles 
Allied 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
allied 
Allied 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
allied 
log(mpce) -0.462 -3.002*** -2.540*** -0.218 -1.638 -1.42 
(-0.275) (-0.236) (-0.27) (-1.406) (-1.491) (-1.172) 
log(mpce) squared 0.01 0.181*** 0.172*** 0.001 0.093 0.092 
(-0.019) (-0.016) (-0.019) (-0.109) (-0.116) (-0.091) 
land possessed 0.010* 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.013 0.041*** 0.028*** 
(-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) 
education primary -0.251*** -0.553*** -0.302*** -0.232*** -0.472*** -0.240*** 
(-0.018) (-0.018) (-0.019) (-0.024) (-0.025) (-0.025) 
education secondary -0.508*** -0.651*** -0.143*** -0.553*** -0.732*** -0.179*** 
(-0.025) (-0.024) (-0.027) (-0.038) (-0.039) (-0.043) 
education college -0.719*** 0.194*** 0.913*** -0.887*** -0.263** 0.625*** 
(-0.045) (-0.039) (-0.046) (-0.094) (-0.09) (-0.1) 
age 0.072*** 0.177*** 0.105*** 0.080*** 0.192*** 0.113*** 
(-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) 
age squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
married -0.022 -1.014*** -0.992*** -0.05 -0.953*** -0.902*** 
(-0.02) (-0.019) (-0.021) (-0.029) (-0.028) (-0.029) 
hindu 0.200*** 0.286*** 0.086** 0.093* 0.200*** 0.107* 
(-0.029) (-0.028) (-0.031) (-0.038) (-0.04) (-0.042) 
adivasi 0.487*** 1.251*** 0.765*** 0.519*** 1.353*** 0.834*** 
(-0.041) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.052) (-0.052) (-0.051) 
dalit 0.216*** 0.484*** 0.268*** 0.293*** 0.580*** 0.287*** 
(-0.027) (-0.027) (-0.029) (-0.038) (-0.04) (-0.041) 
obc 0.063* 0.263*** 0.200*** 0.105** 0.339*** 0.234*** 
(-0.025) (-0.024) (-0.027) (-0.034) (-0.037) (-0.039) 
household size -0.052*** -0.036*** 0.016** -0.058*** -0.041*** 0.017** 
(-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
children under 5 0.035*** -0.032*** -0.067*** 0.055*** -0.029* -0.084*** 
(-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.012) 
maleworkercount 0.057*** -0.089*** -0.146*** 0.036** -0.111*** -0.146*** 
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.011) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.014) 
round66 0.110*** -0.123*** -0.233*** 0.098* -0.308*** -0.407*** 
(-0.032) (-0.027) (-0.032) (-0.041) (-0.038) (-0.04) 
round68 0.616*** -0.008 -0.623*** 0.676*** -0.177*** -0.853*** 
(-0.03) (-0.027) (-0.03) (-0.041) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
constant 1.695 9.621*** 7.926*** 0.321 4.234 3.912 
(-0.998) (-0.866) (-0.977) (-4.553) (-4.808) (-3.776) 
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N 247341 247341 247341 116906 116906 116906 
Log likelihood -232737 -232737 -232737 -110649.26 -110649.26 -110649.26 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. State dummies were included, results
available upon request	
Table 5: Regression Results with Provisioning Variables	
All Quintiles Bottom Three Quintiles 
Allied 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
allied 
Allied 
against 
domestic 
FLP 
against 
domestic 
FLP against 
allied 
log(mpce) -0.04 -1.587*** -1.547*** 1.714 -0.56 -2.274 
(-0.313) (-0.295) (-0.318) (-1.876) (-2.238) (-1.606) 
log(mpce) squared -0.02 0.079*** 0.099*** -0.145) 0.013 0.158 
(-0.021) (-0.02) (-0.022) (-0.144) (-0.172) (-0.123) 
basicfood share -0.681*** -1.272*** -0.591*** -1.418*** -2.338*** -0.921*** 
(-0.15) (-0.137) (-0.148) (-0.234) (-0.235) (-0.226) 
nonfoodbasic share -0.419*** -0.813*** -0.394** -1.283*** -2.021*** -0.737** 
(-0.122) (-0.111) (-0.128) (-0.246) (-0.252) (-0.251) 
pds share -1.169*** 4.873*** 6.043*** -1.223** 6.391*** 7.614*** 
(-0.31) (-0.284) (-0.263) (-0.408) (-0.414) (-0.325) 
land possessed 0.018** 0.040*** 0.021*** 0.022* 0.037*** 0.015 
(-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.005) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
education primary -0.245*** -0.537*** -0.292*** -0.203*** -0.475*** -0.272*** 
(-0.021) (-0.022) (-0.023) (-0.029) (-0.032) (-0.031) 
education secondary -0.521*** -0.703*** -0.182*** -0.528*** -0.770*** -0.242*** 
(-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.032) (-0.044) (-0.047) (-0.05) 
education college -0.768*** 0.063 0.831*** -0.935*** -0.341*** 0.594*** 
(-0.05) (-0.046) (-0.052) (-0.101) (-0.099) (-0.109) 
age 0.079*** 0.188*** 0.109*** 0.089*** 0.206*** 0.117*** 
(-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
age squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
married -0.014 -1.210*** -1.196*** -0.084* -1.214*** -1.130*** 
(-0.026) (-0.024) (-0.027) (-0.038) (-0.038) (-0.038) 
hindu 0.230*** 0.345*** 0.115** 0.091* 0.194*** 0.104* 
(-0.034) (-0.033) (-0.037) (-0.046) (-0.049) (-0.051) 
adivasi 0.432*** 0.924*** 0.493*** 0.477*** 1.019*** 0.543*** 
(-0.048) (-0.047) (-0.046) (-0.063) (-0.066) (-0.061) 
dalit 0.118*** 0.332*** 0.214*** 0.173*** 0.413*** 0.239*** 
(-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.035) (-0.046) (-0.051) (-0.051) 
obc 0.003 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.038 0.276*** 0.238*** 
(-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.032) (-0.042) (-0.048) (-0.049) 
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household size -0.059*** -0.028*** 0.031*** -0.070*** -0.017 0.052*** 
(-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
children under 5 0.045*** -0.024* -0.069*** 0.073*** -0.004 -0.077*** 
(-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.014) (-0.016) (-0.016) 
maleworkercount 0.057*** -0.088*** -0.144*** 0.028 -0.147*** -0.175*** 
(-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.017) (-0.019) (-0.019) 
round68 0.560*** -0.035 -0.595*** 0.628*** -0.074 -0.702*** 
(-0.031) (-0.027) (-0.03) (-0.042) (-0.041) (-0.04) 
constant 0.954 4.556*** 3.601** -4.647 0.938 5.585 
(-1.151) (-1.096) (-1.166) (-6.123) (-7.298) (-5.229) 
N 148608 148608 148608 68122 68122 68122 
Log likelihood -138749.01 -138749.01 -138749.01 -63360.79 -63360.79 -63360.79 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. State dummies were included, results
available upon request	
Table 6: Average Marginal Effects, with provision variables 
All MPCE quintiles Bottom three MPCE quintiles 
Domestic 
activities 
Allied 
activities LFP 
Domestic 
activities 
Allied 
activities LFP 
log(mpce) 0.156** 0.114* -0.270*** -0.147 0.387 -0.239 
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.28) 
basicfood share 0.196*** -0.029 -0.167*** 0.352*** -0.082* -0.270*** 
(-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.03) 
nonfoodbasic share 0.124*** -0.016 -0.108*** 0.311*** -0.082 -0.229*** 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
pds share -0.338*** -0.590*** 0.928*** -0.387*** -0.785*** 1.172*** 
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.05) 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Full results available upon request
